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Introduction 
1. An unusual title and an unlikely comparison 
The history of philosophy is undoubtedly full of authors and writings that one can 
study in order to deal with the problematic articulation between the Universalist 
discourses and the concept (or experience) of Otherness. Given this fullness of choices, 
this paper’s title might seem awkward since neither Hans Kelsen’s writings nor Claude 
Lefort’s works appear at first sight to deliver thoughts on these themes. 
Indeed, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) is one of the most significant European legal 
thinkers of the mid-twentieth century. Surely, one is familiar with the author’s major 
work, the Pure Theory of Law. In this emblematic book, and in more than four hundred 
writings, one finds the expression of the same idea: Kelsen’s lifetime work is in fact an 
effort to build a scientific knowledge of law. This perspective is based on a particular neo-
Kantian epistemology1 of human cognition: because men can only build a scientific 
knowledge with empirical facts as raw material, they cannot access an absolute concept of 
justice. Therefore, the scientific effort to know the essence of law is correlated with a 
strong rejection of Natural Law. According to Kelsen, the Natural Law doctrine is non-
scientific by definition since it pretends to detain an absolute concept of justice; in other 
words, it oversteps what the Pure Theory considers to be the limits of human cognition. 
This radical opposition to Natural Law theories in the name of science is a strong claim 
that one can find haunting the whole work of Kelsen.  
On the other hand, Claude Lefort (1924-2010) is a contemporary French political 
philosopher known for his conception of Democracy as an “empty place”, and for his 
 
We use as much as possible the English translations available. For this reason, we also indicate the 
original references used with the help of the following abbreviation: “OV”. The reader will find a 
complete list of the original texts and their translations at the end of the paper. 
 
1 On this particular topic, see: Merle, J.-Ch., “La conception du droit de Hermann Cohen et de Hans 
Kelsen”, Revue germanique internationale, 6, http://rgi.revues.org/1095 and Wilson, H., “Is Kelsen 
really a Kantian?”, in: Tur, R. & Twining, W., (eds.) Essays on Kelsen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986, pp. 37-64. 
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denunciation of totalitarianisms2. Lefort’s work focuses on these political forms because, 
according to him, they are not political regimes but a way used by people to live in the 
Modern Era3. From this perspective, the modern political world is considered and defined 
as something in movement, dynamic, and always changing – in short: modern societies are 
a new way of both doing and thinking the political. This claim makes sense if one 
considers Lefort’s view on the Modern Era itself: it is the point of history where men are 
experiencing a new world, a world where the ultimate markers of certainty have been 
dissolved4. This new Weltanschauung, this unique worldview leaves men with an 
alternative: either they choose to assume this unsettling radical indeterminacy, or they 
choose to annihilate it. The first choice is precisely what Democracy is: it is the choice to 
assume together that every decision taken will be questioned and that nothing can be 
settled once and for all. The second choice, on the contrary, is that of Totalitarianism. It is 
the refusal of the constant questioning implied by Modernity: in this framework, people 
refer to a symbolic pole that will be in charge of indicating what is good and what is not, 
what is just and what is unjust, etc. In other words, they try to annihilate the 
uninterrupted questioning correlated with their modern conditions, by hiding it behind a 
symbolic pole of power that seems to be stable. 
These short introductions to Hans Kelsen and Claude Lefort might force one to 
assume that a comparative reading of the two authors will be, not only out of focus 
regarding the theme illustrated earlier – the interrelation between Universalist discourses 
and the concept of Otherness – but also inconsistent. Furthermore, nothing seems to link 
them to one another considering they were not contemporaries and not even compatriots. 
 
 
 
2 See Flynn, B., The Philosophy of Claude Lefort, Interpreting the Political, Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2005, p. XXI: “Arguably Lefort is one of the few political 
philosophers, together with Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, and a small number of others, who 
have elaborated a plausible interpretation of the totalitarian phenomenon.” 
3 See Lefort, C., “Three notes on Leo Strauss” in Writing, the political test, (D. Ames ; Trans.), 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000, p.200 : “Let anyone who doubts that [the fact that 
Democracy cannot be reduced to its institutions] simply observe how difficult it is, for a people 
accustomed to live under a despotic regime, to regain the will to be free. A change of institutions 
does not suffice to achieve it.” (OV: Lefort, C., “Trois notes sur Leo Strauss”, in Ecrire, A l’épreuve du 
politique, Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1992, p.296). In other words, according to Lefort, Democracy is not 
merely defined by democratic institutions. 
4 See Lefort, C., “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism” in The Political Forms of Modern 
Society. Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism. (A. Sheridan; Trans.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 1986, pp. 292-319, pp.303-304 : “Democracy inaugurates the experience of an 
ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be said to be sovereign, of course, but 
whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain latent.” (OV: Lefort, 
C., “L’image du corps et le totalitarisme”, in L’invention démocratique, Paris: Fayard, (1981) 1994, 
pp.172-173). 
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2. The possibility of a comparative reading 
Nevertheless, this paper would like to open the door to such a comparative reading. 
The first reason that seems to justify such a gesture is Leo Strauss: although there has 
never been a direct discussion connecting Kelsen and Lefort, Strauss seems to be able to 
bridge their respective works. Indeed, Natural Right and History – probably Strauss’s most 
famous work5 – is a more or less direct criticism of Kelsen’s legal positivism6. Strauss’s 
criticism of modern social sciences is quite well known: in his view, they are a poisoned 
fruit since they directly lead men to nihilism7. What he in fact denounces is the moral 
relativism that these sciences defend and postulate as the only legitimate rational option 
for men. In this framework, one can understand why, according to Strauss, the Kelsenian 
legal positivism and its rejection of Natural Law constitute a perfect example of modern 
moral relativism. 
Moreover, Lefort reads Strauss’s work with admiration and considers him to be “one 
of the most penetrating thinkers of our time (…)”8. But despite his sympathy for Strauss, 
and although he agrees that relativism can potentially lead to nihilism, Lefort does not 
completely adopt Strauss’s rejection of moral relativism. On reflection, he contends, moral 
relativism can appear to be more than merely a modern inconsistency; it can also be 
interpreted as the consequence of modernity’s ultimate indeterminacy. Therefore, it 
appears to be both the result and the condition of Modern Democracy. 
 
5 See Smith, B. S., “Leo Strauss, the Outlines of a Life” in: Smith, S. B. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion 
to Leo Strauss., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.32 : “Natural Right and History 
remains even today Strauss’s most widely read book.” 
6 See Strauss, L., Natural Right and History, Chicago: Chicago University Press, (1953) 1965, p. 4 fn. 
2. I quote at length: “The assertion that there exists no legal order [Rechtsordnung] in despotic 
regimes, but instead the arbitrariness [Willkür] of the despot, is entirely senseless… since a State 
ruled in a despotic way, also constitutes a certain regulation [Ordnung] of human behaviors… This 
regulation is precisely the legal order. Denying its legal character is only natural law’s naïveté or 
arrogance… What is interpreted as arbitrary is simply the despot’s legal possibility of making every 
decision himself, of determining in an unconditional way the actions of subsidiary bodies, and of 
modifying or repealing at any time the general or even only the particular validity [Geltung] of 
established norms. Such a state is a legal state [Rechtszustand], even if it is judged as harmful. It also 
has positive aspects. The not so unusual call for dictatorship in modern states of law clearly 
demonstrates this.” Since Strauss directly quotes Kelsen in German, I use and complete David 
Novak’s translation here. See Novak, D., “Haunted by the Ghost of Weimar: Leo Strauss’ Critique of 
Hans Kelsen” in: Kaplan, L. V., & Koshar, R., (eds.) The Weimar Moment: Liberalism, Political 
Theology, and Law, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2012, p.395. 
7 See Strauss, L., Natural Right and History, p. 3: “The contemporary rejection of natural right leads 
to nihilism – nay it is identical with nihilism.” 
8 Lefort, C., “Politics and Human Rights”, in: The Political Forms of Modern Society, pp. 239-282, 
p.239. (OV: Lefort, C., “Droits de l’homme et politique”, in : L’invention démocratique, p.45). See also: 
Lefort, C., “La dissolution des repères et l’enjeu démocratique” in : Le Temps Présent. Ecrits de 1945-
2005, Paris: Belin, (1986) 2007, p. 551, where he states that Strauss is one of the rare contemporary 
philosopher who tries to build a political philosophy. Claudia Hilb gives a study of Lefort’s reading 
of Strauss in her article: “Claude Lefort as Reader of Leo Strauss”, in: Plot, M. (ed.) Claude Lefort: 
Thinker of the Political, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp.71-86. 
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If one takes a closer look at Lefort’s definition of Modern Democracy, one sees not 
only the possibility of a comparative reading with Hans Kelsen, but also the possibility of 
articulating the link between Universalist discourses and the concept of Otherness: this 
constitutes the second reason justifying the comparative reading this paper aims to 
achieve. Indeed, according to Lefort, Modern Era is the time defined by the discovery of 
Otherness. In other words, the awareness of Otherness emerges within Modern 
Democracy. In this sense, the moral relativism defended by modern social sciences – or, as 
the paper will show, one might also say the rejection that modern social sciences make of 
universalist discourses – can be read as a direct effect of the entry of Otherness in people’s 
Weltanschauung. This specific attempt to capture the essence of Modernity as the 
particular emergence of the Otherness allows one to read Kelsen and Lefort together. 
The main idea here is to determine whether Lefort’s interpretation of Modernity can 
be applied to the Kelsenian relativistic axiology. If such a comparison works, then it will 
not only give credit to Lefort’s claim that the discourses produced by modern social 
sciences are in fact motivated by and based on the discovery of Otherness, but it will also 
“rehabilitate” Kelsen’s moral relativism9. The latter could then be perceived not as 
inconsistent, but as an example of how a scholar tried to deal with modernity’s radical 
indeterminacy. Furthermore, this comparative reading could also leave room for a new 
interpretation of Kelsen’s moral relativism as compatible with a particular concept of 
Human Rights, namely the modern one. In short, the main goal of this paper is to raise the 
question concerning whether it is possible to combine the awareness of Otherness – i.e. a 
rejection of Universalist discourses – with a form or concept of human universality. The 
ambition here is not to answer, but only to raise this question, animated by the conviction 
that:  
“Genuine knowledge of a fundamental question, thorough understanding of it, is better than 
blindness to it, or indifference to it (…)”10 
 
3. Plan 
In order to raise the question of a potential compatibility between the awareness of 
Otherness on the one hand, and a form of universality on the other, some hypotheses 
should first be formulated and defined.  
 
9 Rehabilitation seems an appropriate gesture since only few scholars consider the moral relativism 
defended by Kelsen to be more than an inconsistency. See for instance: Paulson, S. L., “On the Puzzle 
Surrounding Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm”, Ratio Juris, 13 (3), 2000, p. 293, who considers that, in 
order to defend his separation thesis (between law and morals), Kelsen is not offering arguments 
but only “a crass and vulgar moral relativism”. 
10 Strauss, L., “What is political philosophy?” in Journals of Politics (19), 3, 1957, p.344. 
Re-Thinking Europe. Volume 1 – 2011 
27 
1) How does moral relativism equate to the rejection of universal discourses?  
2) Consequently, how can this rejection be understood as a result of Modernity?  
3) How can Modernity be understood as recognition of Otherness?  
The current paper will attempt to outline some answers to these questions based on 
four main texts.  
Firstly, in order to explicate the main lines of the Kelsenian relativistic axiology it 
seems crucial to consider his second edition of the Pure Theory of Law11, since one can find 
within it the grounds for a limitation of human cognition. His Farewell Lecture, “What is 
justice?”12, is also relevant to this theme since in it he claims that the human world is a 
world of relative and conflicting values. The combination of these two ideas leads to the 
rejection of Universalist discourses – identified with the ones of Natural Law theories – in 
the name of science.  
Secondly, three of Lefort’s articles seem to be relevant. The first, “The Image of the 
Body and Totalitarianism”, enables us to understand his symbolic political philosophy, and 
more importantly, to introduce his definition of Modernity. “Dissolution of Marks and 
Democratic Challenge”13 focuses more on the concept of moral relativism, whilst 
interpreting it as a consistent reaction to modern indeterminacy. Finally, “Politics and 
Human Rights” offers a restricted concept of Human Rights, reminiscent of Hannah 
Arendt’s views14, namely that human rights mean the rights to have rights.  
 
11 Kelsen, H., Pure Theory of Law. (M. Knight; Trans.) New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange LTD, 
(1967) 2008. (OV: Reine Recthslehre. Wien: Verlag Österreich, (1960) 2000.) 
12 Kelsen, H., “What is justice?” in What is justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science, 
New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange LTD, (1957), 2013, pp.1-24. One can also listen to the Farewell 
Lecture Kelsen: http://gradlectures.berkeley.edu/lecture/what-is-justice/ 
13 Since this article is unfortunately not yet available in English, we will refer to the original French 
text, and translate some parts of it when necessary: Cf. Lefort, C., “La dissolution des repères et 
l’enjeu démocratique” in Le Temps Présent, pp. 551-570. 
14 Arendt and Lefort’s views are close, but not identical. In fact, Lefort himself mentions that “the 
expression [the right to have rights] is borrowed from Hannah Arendt, although she uses it in a 
rather different sense.” (Lefort, C., “Human Rights and the Welfare State”, in Democracy and Political 
Theory, (D. Macey; Trans.), Cambridge: Polity Press, (1984) 1988, p.37; OV: Lefort, C., “Les droits de 
l’homme et l’Etat Providence”, in Essais sur le Politique, Paris: Seuil, 1986, p. 55). From Lefort’s 
perspective, the right to have rights is understood as the right to claim rights. Hence, the expression 
implies a certain opposition to the power, an opposition needed in order to earn new rights. 
Moreover, this new meaning of right emerges with Democracy. Herein lies the main point of 
disagreement between the two scholars: according to Lefort, Arendt’s use of this expression as 
synonymous with individual rights makes her incapable of embracing social vindications. Indeed, 
the right to have rights is related to her concept of birth: it is within this event – an event that all 
individuals share in common – that lies the notion of universal right. All human beings ought to 
have the right to have rights due to the mere fact that they are born in a human community that, in 
turn, ought to recognize them as its members. In short, Lefort finds the expression to be strongly 
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I. Moral relativism as a rejection of universal discourses: the Kelsenian 
epistemology  
Kelsen’s axiology allows one to consider moral relativism as a rejection of universal 
discourses, particularly the ones defended by Natural Law doctrines. From this 
perspective, the discourses that use universal concepts are considered to be universal 
discourses: this definition is the one that will be used throughout this paper. In Kelsen’s 
view, these discourses are inconsistent. Firstly, they are inconsistent because they go 
beyond the limits of human cognition, and secondly, they dogmatically ignore the human 
empirical world where only relative values exist. 
 
1. The Pure Theory of Law: the limits of human cognition 
Kelsen’s moral relativism is a direct consequence of his scientific goal to build a pure 
knowledge of law. Therefore, his moral position is based on what he considers to be a 
legitimate and scientific knowledge. In this framework, the question of morality is only 
raised because of the question of human knowledge, but how does Kelsen define 
legitimate human knowledge? 
The difference he makes between ‘knowing’ and ‘evaluating’ is helpful here. 
According to Kelsen, to know something is an action not only different from, but also 
contradictory with the fact of evaluating something. When one knows something or tries 
to access such knowledge, one is in fact using their cognition, and the knowledge that 
emanates from cognition is basically a descriptive one: to know something means to try as 
 
related to Democracy, while Arendt thinks it points to a human natural right given by the mere fact 
of being born. With regard to Arend’s expression, see Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, Janovich, 1951. A helpful study that places the expression in the context of the 
entire Arendtian work can be found in both: Birmingham, P., “The An-Archic Event of Natality and 
the “Right to have Rights”.” in Social Research, (74), 3, 2007, pp.763-776 and Birmingham, P., 
Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2006. The latter focuses on the particular difference between Arendt and 
Lefort concerning the “right to have rights” pp. 44-45. On the general opposition between the two 
scholars, see also the following articles by Claude Lefort: “Hannah Arendt and the Question of the 
Political” (1985) in Democracy and Political Theory, pp. 44-55 (OV: “Hannah Arendt et la question 
du politique” in Essais sur le politique, pp. 64-78.); “Hannah Arendt: antisémitisme et génocide des 
juifs” (1982) in Le Temps Présent, pp. 505-528 ; “Hannah Arendt on the Law of Movement and 
Ideology” and “The Perversion of Law” (1999) in Complications, Communism and the Dilemmas of 
Democracy, (J. Bourg ; Trans.) New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp.146-157 and pp.158-
165 (OV: La complication, Retour sur le Communisme, Paris: Fayard, 1986.); “Le sens de 
l’orientation”(1996) in M., Merleau Ponty, Notes de cours sur l’origine de la géométrie de Husserl 
suivi de: Recherches de la phénoménologie. Paris: PUF, 1998, pp. 221-238; “Thinking with and 
against Hannah Arendt” (2002) in Social Research, (69), 2, 2002, pp.447-459. For a short overview 
of some differences between Arendt and Lefort see Flynn, B., The Philosophy of Claude Lefort, 
Interpreting the Political, pp. 255-267. 
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much as possible to grasp it as it is. In this operation, the knowing subject is a subject 
exterior to its object; he plays the role of an objective observer. On the contrary, when one 
evaluates something, one is exercising one’s will: evaluation is an act of human will and 
not an act of human cognition. The nature of human will is prescriptive; it tries to make its 
object in conformity with some desires. Therefore, evaluation is essentially an attempt to 
modify objects: it is an ideological act15. 
To understand how Kelsen equates the pair knowledge/evaluation to the pair 
rational/irrational, one has to keep in mind the main distinction he makes in his Pure 
Theory of Law, namely between Sein and Sollen. According to Kelsen, only the world of Sein 
can provide a rational knowledge. In other words, only knowledge of laws as they are is 
reachable for man. An approach of laws as they ought to be is typically what Natural Law 
doctrines attempt to reach, and such an approach is unacceptable from a scientific point of 
view since it is not based on human reason, but on human will. It delivers an object that is 
modified by human desires, and it does not tell us what the object is, but what a particular 
human being wants it to be. Here Kelsen builds a dichotomy between the world of Sein and 
the world of Sollen on a meta-theoretical level: this dichotomy is used in order to draw the 
boundaries of the theory of law itself. This determination of the framework in which the 
theory could constitute itself as legitimate and scientific means the strict restriction of 
human cognition to the world of Sein. In short, according to Kelsen, a legitimate human 
knowledge is in fact a description of how things are – and particularly, in the case of his 
legal science, of what laws are16.  
How does this particular Kelsenian epistemology lead to the rejection of Universalist 
discourses? The meta-theoretical separation of Sein and Sollen is a strong claim presented 
against Natural Law theories, and in Kelsen’s view, the main characterization of such 
theories is to pretend to detain an absolute and hence, a universal concept of justice. If one 
agrees with Kelsen on the limits of human cognition, then one also rejects, not only any 
Natural Law theory, but also any human attempt to grasp universal concepts. In other 
words, if human cognition is limited to the world of Sein, then all Universalist discourses 
are immediately discredited. It is needless to say that such a view implies a particular 
definition of the empirical world: this world must not contain universal concepts.  
 
15 In the first edition of the Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen already claims how his scientific ambition is 
strongly opposed to ideology, and therefore, why the science of law can only be a descriptive one. 
See: Kelsen, H., Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, (B. Litschewski, S. L. Paulson; Trans.) 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1934) 1997, pp. 18-19. (OV: Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die 
rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, (1934) 2008, II, §9, pp. 29-30). 
16 From this perspective, the pure theory of law is a legal positivism since it aims only  
to consider the positive law. For different aspects of legal positivism and its roots, see:  
Green, L., “Legal Positivism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/legal-positivism/ and Hart, H. L. A., 
“Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, New 
York: Oxford University Press, (1958) 1983, pp. 49-87. 
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2. “What is justice?”: the human empirical world as a world of relative and conflicting values 
Kelsen is fully aware that the latter claim demands some justifications. These are 
explicitly brought in his Farewell Lecture: “What is justice?”. The main claim of this writing 
is to assert that the human world is a world of conflicting values. From this perspective, 
one’s practical decision appears to be only a personal preference or the result of a 
determinate emotive state, since it is rationally impossible to decide which values are 
higher17. Applied to the concept of justice, such a claim means the rational impossibility 
for human beings to know or to define an absolute justice. As such, what is considered 
depends solely on a cultural or historical context. In fact, philosophical history gives proof 
of this18: multiple and diverse moral concepts have been defended from Plato until Kant, 
and despite these great thinkers’ efforts, no consensus about what is just and what is 
unjust has been reached. The main reason for this lack of universal consensus about 
justice resides in the fact that: 
“The absolute in general, and the absolute values in particular, are beyond human reason, for 
which only a conditional, and in this sense relative, solution of the problem of justice (…) is 
possible.”19 
Although it is impossible to decide absolutely which values are better in order to 
behave, this does not mean human practical life is condemned to nihilism, to the absence 
of values. The Kelsenian moral relativism is not amoral or immoral. On the contrary, it 
consistently calls for human responsibility: if all values are potentially good or bad, then 
one has to decide on one’s own and choose carefully with what values one wants to 
conduct one’s life. Here the concept of tolerance intervenes as a rational criterion: 
tolerance is the only concept that is able to assume all moral conceptions in their diversity 
and multiplicity. Tolerance means welcoming the moral, religious, or political viewpoints 
of others: it means trying to understand opinions and beliefs of other human beings, 
especially the ones we do not share. In the end it becomes the condition of possibility for a 
 
17 This position is clearly and explicitly stated in the General Theory of Law and State: “There is no 
possibility of deciding rationally between opposite values. It is precisely from this situation that a 
really tragic conflict arises: the conflict between the fundamental principle of science, Truth, and 
the supreme idea of politics, Justice.” H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, London: Oxford 
University Press, (1945) 1949, p. XVI. Once again, this idea is not new since Kelsen already stated it 
in the first edition of the Pure Theory of Law, where he claims that from the perspective of rational 
knowledge, one can only see conflicts of interests. When one is resolving a conflict, one is in fact 
electing an interest, and abandoning another one. Cf. Kelsen, H., Introduction to the Problems of 
Legal Theory, p.17. (OV: Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, p. 
28.) 
18 See: Idem (OV: p.27); Kelsen, H., “Foundations of Democracy” in Ethics (66) 1, 1955, pp.1-101, p. 
98 footnote 70; H. Kelsen, “What is justice?”, p. 21; H. Kelsen, “The Natural Law before the Tribunal 
of Science”, What is justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science, p. 153. 
19 H. Kelsen, “What is justice?”, p.10. 
Re-Thinking Europe. Volume 1 – 2011 
31 
pacific expression of everyone’s opinions. According to Kelsen, “[t]olerance means 
freedom of thoughts”20, and therefore, the ultimate possibility of democracy itself. If 
tolerance cannot tell men how they should behave, or what values are higher – since this is 
not its role – it allows them at least to live together peacefully. It forces them to wonder 
and to question under what form of justice they want to live. Moreover, it requires them to 
look for a compromise: it demands that they give up their own personal interests – since 
personal interests necessarily mean conflicts of interests – in order to seek a general 
interest.  
One should underline how Kelsen’s conclusion at the end of his Farewell Lecture is 
fully consistent with his rejection of an absolutist conception of values. Indeed, he formally 
defines his own position as a preference: a preference for democracy, a preference for 
tolerance. 
“Since science is my profession, and hence the most important thing in my life, justice, to me, 
is that social order under whose protection the search for truth can prosper. “My” justice, 
then, is the justice of freedom, the justice of peace, the justice of democracy – the justice of 
tolerance.”21 
Moreover, since his moral standpoint is a preference, it is then debatable. The 
rejection of Universalist discourses based on the limits of human cognition is the condition 
of a moral and political debate. In other words, since we do not know absolutely what 
justice is, we have to try to find a form of justice that allows us to live together. 
II. Modernity as ultimate indeterminacy 
In order to see how Kelsen’s views can be interpreted as an effect of Modernity, one 
must first define Modernity. Claude Lefort’s political philosophy seems to offer a fruitful 
insight into it.  
 
1. Modern Era: experiences of irreversibility and uncertainty 
According to him, in the Modern Era men are confronted with two sorts of 
experiences. The first one is the feeling they have of irreversibility, namely a feeling that it 
 
20 Ibid., p. 23. 
21 Ibid., p. 24. For a debate on this conception of tolerance, and the problems it raises, see: J. Bjarup, 
“Kelsen’s Theory of Law and Philosophy of Justice” as well as Pettit, P., “Kelsen’s Theory of Law and 
Philosophy of Justice”, in Essays on Kelsen, pp. 273-304 and pp. 305-318. Leo Strauss also stresses 
the inconsistency of the concept of tolerance defended by modern social sciences: Strauss, L., 
Natural Right and History, pp. 12-13. 
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is impossible to return to the Past. This feeling is correlative to a sense of future that is 
completely new compared to the Classical Era. Lefort is not saying that Pre-Modern 
societies do not have a sense of future22. He is far from defending ethnocentric / colonialist 
/ racist views, and does not deny a temporality in Pre-Modern societies: such societies 
have an experience of the Past, as well as the Present and the Future. In this sense, Pre-
Modern and Modern societies do not differ because the latter have a history and not the 
former. The difference resides elsewhere: what distinguishes Pre-Modern from Modern 
societies is the respective ways that political power is articulated within them. In other 
words, while Pre-Modern societies are the theater of complete determinacy, the Modern 
Era is the place where all possible markers are dissolved. This difference between, on the 
one hand, a world of determinacy, and on the other hand, a world of indeterminacy, 
becomes clear when one focuses on the symbolical role political power has in these 
societies.  
In the Pre-Modern era, the representation one has of one’s social group and of one’s 
world, is strongly dependent on the political power. Political power is the symbolic force 
that holds the ultimate keys of the legitimate and illegitimate, of the just and unjust, of the 
truth and untruth. In other words, it clearly and strictly defines the representations people 
have of reality. This has a direct consequence on the way people experience temporality: 
since the political symbolically determines everything, then the Past, the Present, and the 
Future are not blurred; in fact, their definitions are given. To get a glimpse of how people’s 
Weltanschauung is symbolically shaped by the political power, a look at Lefort’s 
description of the figure of the king may be helpful.  
 
22 One cannot suspect Lefort to agree with the unfortunately famous assertion that some societies 
are living in an immediate present. In other words, some societies would not have a historical 
perspective. This is a problematic claim because in the best-case scenario it is inconsistent. When 
one is claiming that other societies do not have a sense of History, it is most of the time to set a 
comparison between their own society and others. Therefore, it is not surprising that such a 
comparison leads to the conclusion that other societies are not as good as their own. It is not a 
surprise because what one is doing in order to come to such a conclusion is to judge other societies 
with the criteria of its own society. Hence, one’s society is already established as superior since the 
only criteria taken into account belong to their society, and not to the others ones that are judged. 
Such a thought is therefore a pure product of an ethnocentric perspective. One has to wonder what 
the relevance is of a comparison between societies when the result is fixed in advance, when the 
criteria of comparison themselves are ideologically selected.  
In the worst-case scenario, this difference between societies that have a sense of history and those 
that do not have knowledge of it is politically dangerous. This difference can potentially serve to 
draw a line between so-called “advanced”, “progressive”, or “civilized” societies, and the other ones. 
When “sense of History” becomes a criterion of civilization, one is therefore faced with a colonialist 
and/or a racist ideology. A perfect example of this trivial stupidity is Nicolas Sarkozy’s Speech in 
Dakar in 2007, and in which the former French President professed: “the African man has not yet 
entered history”. The comparison is no longer oriented towards differences of habits, culture, so on 
and so forth; rather, it focuses directly on human beings. Such a thought implies that there are 
human beings who are more human because they take part in History, while other human beings 
are less human because they are ignorant about what History is. One can easily imagine what kind 
of actions this discourse can justify. 
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2. The symbolic role of the king 
The king plays a crucial role in the Monarchy. If one focuses on the system of 
representations that is inherent to such a political society, one will see that it represents 
itself as a mystical body. It is because of this representation of themselves as part of a 
mystical body, that members of such societies were able to live together. Consequently, 
people represented themselves as part of the king’s body. At the same time the king was 
also the head of this social body, since he was completely merged with the political power. 
Therefore, the king was the warranty of “both organic and mystic”23 social unity: he 
incarnated and thereby conferred an identity and a unity to the social order. In this sense, 
without the symbolic figure of the king, the social order could not be an order since the 
social body cannot exist without him, without people’s identification with him. This also 
means that every member perceived his/her own identity, his/her own essence as 
depending on this representation: one’s identity is defined by the place one has in the 
social body. 
In short, one can see here that the king is the one who draws society’s limits as well 
as its identity; a proof of that is the fact that he essentially determines who is a member of 
the society, and who is not. Moreover, his discourse builds a symbolic reality that shapes 
society’s representation of itself: what the king says determines both how the members of 
society perceive reality and how they live in it. The important point one should retain is 
that the king is the ultimate marker of certainty in Monarchic societies; his discourse and 
his actions have a direct determining consequence on society. Nothing is indeterminate in 
such societies because of the role of the king.  
“The ancien régime was made up of an infinite number of small bodies which gave 
individuals their distinctive marks. All these small bodies fitted together within a great 
imaginary body for which the body of the king provided the model and the guarantee of its 
integrity. The democratic revolution, for so long subterranean, burst out when the body of 
the king was destroyed, when the body politic was decapitated and when, at the same time, 
the corporeality of the social was dissolved. There then occurred what I would call a 
‘disincorporation’ of individuals.”24 
The emergence of universal suffrage means a change regarding the symbolic 
configuration of the society and a new place for power. In Monarchies, the king occupied 
the place of power, for he was a man that society considered at the same time mortal and 
immortal, individual and collective, a man who had an absolute legitimacy since he earned 
 
23 Lefort, C., “The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism”, p. 302. (OV: “L’image du corps et le 
totalitarisme”, in L’Invention démocratique, p.171). 
24 Ibid., p. 303. (OV: Ibid., pp. 171-172). 
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it from God. With Modern Democracy, such a conception of the political power becomes 
simply impossible since the popular sovereignty ensures that legitimacy no longer comes 
from a transcendent pole, but from society itself. Moreover, the place of power is no longer 
occupied indefinitely since people who are elected, are designated for a determined 
amount of time. Furthermore, everyone has the potential to be elected, and as such, the 
political power becomes a matter of competition. Lefort’s most famous definition of 
Modern Democracy, as societies where the place of power is empty, makes sense in this 
context. The democratic place of power is an empty one since it is a place that is occupied 
only temporarily, and by men who are by definition mortal – if one wants to occupy this 
place definitely, one has then to “cheat”, to use “force or cunning”25.  
It will lead us too far from the main point of this presentation to further explain 
Lefort’s conception of Democracy. The main idea one should retain is that Modern 
Democracy is the place where the political power is facing disincorporation. And since 
there is no longer a king to shape people’s Weltanschauung, the members of Modern 
Democracies cannot count on anyone except themselves to find definitions of the 
legitimate and illegitimate, of the just and unjust, of the truth and untruth. As a result, the 
disappearance of the king means the disappearance of the ultimate markers of certainty. 
Getting back to the idea of temporality, one can now fully understand the difference 
between Pre-Modern and Modern societies: the latter cannot count on any determinacy 
for they are literally facing the unknown. The future from now on appears to be both an 
enigma and an unsettling object. 
Conclusion: The possibility of a sense of Universality? 
 
1. The implicit philosophy within modern social sciences: the awareness of Otherness 
If one applies this conclusion to Kelsen’s writings, then one will be able to interpret 
his moral relativism as a result of Modern Democracy. Moral relativism is a thought that 
emerges at a time when men lost all their traditional markers of certainty. The Kelsenian 
call for men’s responsibility echoes such loss: since there is no longer anybody to claim 
what justice is, one has to discover it by oneself.  
 
 
25 Idem. (OV: Ibid., p. 172). 
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“This, of course, implies a very serious responsibility, the most serious moral responsibility a 
man can assume. Positivistic relativism means: moral autonomy.”26 
But doesn’t this call on others to assume responsibility presuppose the recognition 
of others as similar human beings? In other words, when Kelsen tries to remind men of the 
importance of questioning the concept of justice, does he not in fact conclude that every 
man has the potential to accomplish such a task? Does he not mean implicitly that every 
man is equal regarding this potential capacity to question things?  
“They [modern social sciences] can claim that social phenomena are like things, affirm an 
ideal of objectivity or scientific neutrality. What underlies these requirements? It is the 
discovery of the Other who, as such, is also a kind of fellow-man (…)”27 
No longer defined as merely a part of a social body, the Otherness is from now on 
considered as a different and independent entity: this is the perspective that Modern 
Democracy brings. According to Lefort, all these positivistic attempts to reach a scientific 
knowledge of men and human facts are motivated more or less implicitly by this 
philosophy. Modern social sciences derive their strength from the awareness of the others 
as fellow men. The moral relativism they lead to should be rejected as though it means 
nihilism. But, in the end, it seems that there is an acceptable form of relativism: that is, the 
one that makes us question others, take their perspective, in order to look back at our own 
thoughts, our own perspectives, to question ourselves and maybe even revise our judgments. 
This is the strength of Modern Democracy; it forces us to acknowledge the Otherness and 
its real place. This acknowledgement is only possible if the Otherness is recognized as 
equal to the Self, if one can perceive in others their common humanity. What else can the 
Kelsenian conception of tolerance mean except this? When one welcomes the views of 
others, one implicitly presupposes that these views are worth welcoming: a common 
humanity between men is thereby presupposed. 
 
2. Human Rights as the utterance of rights 
Only in this Modern framework where the social world, in order to be shaped, 
requests the expressed opinions of every one of its members, can the question of Human 
Rights be reformulated. It would not be consistent to define Human Rights as rights that 
are given by an ultimate authority such as the king or God. In fact, there is no way of 
properly defining Human Rights in a socio-political context where every single value is 
debatable. However, does this mean that such Rights do not exist? Lefort contends that the 
respective symbolic status of the law and the political power have changed with the 
 
26 Kelsen, H., “Foundations of Democracy”, p. 97 footnote 70. 
27 Lefort, C., “La dissolution des repères et l’enjeu démocratique”, p. 556 (my translation). 
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emergence of Democracy. Democracy is this new configuration of a society where men can 
demand to be allowed to speak and to publicly express their opinions. Kelsen’s preference 
for Democracy is fully compatible with such a view since it is based on the fact that men 
cannot be certain of what is right and what is not. They are therefore placed in the position 
of debating together in order to determine what is legitimate and what is illegitimate. 
“Only if it is not possible to decide in an absolute way what is right and what is wrong is it 
advisable to discuss the issue and, after discussion, to submit a compromise.”28 
According to Lefort, this means that the legal question is now located beyond the 
reach of the political power. This does not mean however that the political power has no 
influence on laws, or on deciding which laws ought to be prescribed. This only means that 
the society is the force where the question of laws first emerges. The source of the law has 
changed in Modern Democracy, precisely because Modern Democracy emerged with the 
claiming of rights coming from society, namely the claim for universal suffrage.  
 
3. Human nature as an enigma 
Getting back to the notion of Human Rights, one can give a new definition that is 
neither metaphysical nor dependent on Natural Law theories. The concept of Human 
Rights does not mean anything more than the ability to claim rights, or the utterance of 
rights. It does not presuppose some kind of nature of things, or some kind of human 
nature, namely, a fictive nature-in-itself. Such concepts are no longer consistently possible 
when one takes into account both Lefort’s views on Modernity, and Kelsen’s criticisms of 
Natural Law theories. If the ultimate markers of certainty are lost, then human beings are 
also subject to indeterminacy. Indeed, they cannot rely on something or somebody to 
determine who they are, or what their roles are. Thus, in the Modern Era, human nature 
also becomes an enigma.  
“The idea of human nature, which was so vigorously proclaimed at the end of the eighteenth 
century, could never capture the meaning of the undertaking inaugurated by the great 
American and French declarations. By reducing the source of right to the human utterance of 
right, they made an enigma of both humanity and right.”29 
 
28 Kelsen, H., “Foundations of Democracy”, p. 97 fn. 70. 
29 Lefort, C., “Human Rights and the Welfare State”, p. 37. It is meaningful that Lefort uses the 
concept of “enigma” because of its Greek root: αἴνιγμα comes from αἰνίσσομαι that means, “to 
speak in riddles”. The linguistic aspect involved in the Greek root can be found also in the 
humanism defended by Lefort: according to him, Modern Democracy acknowledges the fact that 
when human beings are talking or debating with one another, there is a part of the discourse that is 
inherently evasive. In other words, discourse of Otherness is essentially always ambiguous and 
mysterious; its speech as well as its essence is condemned to be something that one can never 
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entirely grasp. These ungraspable dimensions of human discourse and essence make one realize 
how different one is from the others. This radical difference means also that one is condemned to 
be alone: “Man cannot forget solitude.” (Lefort, C., “La dissolution des repères et l’enjeu 
démocratique”, p. 567. my translation.) Despite its heavy weight, this modern solitude also has a 
positive effect: “Nonetheless, there is a useful form of solitude tied to the institution of democratic 
society. Man alone can be drowned in the crowd, but it is also there that he is called upon to realize 
he is different.” (Idem.) 
Of course, this way of presenting the philosophy of Lefort seems to suggest a certain “family 
resemblance” between his views, and the ones of Sartre. Indeed, the aforementioned quote is 
reminiscent of the following lines of Existentialism is a Humanism: “(…) when we speak of 
“abandonment” – one of Heidegger’s favorite expressions – we merely mean to say that God does 
not exist, and that we must bear the full consequences of the assertion.” (Sartre, J. P., Existentialism 
is a Humanism, (C. Macomber; Trans.), New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2007, p. 27. (OV: 
L’existentialisme est un humanisme, Paris: Folio, (1945) 1996, p. 37) This familiar resemblance is 
invalid in my opinion, especially if one carefully reads how Sartre defines his philosophy. In fact, 
two main aspects of his definition put him in clear opposition with Lefort. The first aspect is the 
emphasis he puts on human subjectivity: “(…) [E]xistentialism is a doctrine that makes human life 
possible and also affirms that every truth and every action imply an environment and a human 
subjectivity.” (Ibid., p. 18 ; OV: Ibid., p. 23) According to Sartre, human beings are condemned to be 
free and are therefore responsible for their choices. This freedom of choice is something that Lefort 
does not postulate. Moreover, it is not because of this kind of freedom that Lefort deduces the 
modern solitude, he rather attributes it to the loss of the markers of certainty, and therefore, to a 
political change that is Modern Democracy. Thus, while one author defends subjectivism, the other 
establishes a hermeneutic of social and political changes. Hence, the two standpoints are different, 
and do not assume the same assertions. The second aspect that allows one to evaluate how the two 
scholars are defending different views is the concept of humanism. According to Sartre, his 
existentialism is a humanism based on the concepts of freedom and responsibility: “(…) we can 
claim that human universality exists, but it is not a given; it is in perpetual construction. In choosing 
myself, I construct universality; I construct it by understanding every other man’s project, 
regardless of the era in which he lives.” (Ibid., p.43 ; OV: Ibid., p.61) Despite the fact that human 
beings are condemned to choose in their environment, that is here and now, each of their individual 
choices involves the whole mankind. When one chooses, one does so assuming that one’s choice can 
be universalized to mankind. In short, existentialism is a humanism since an individual’s choice 
engages not only himself/herself, but also mankind in general. Hence, one can see how the 
existentialist’s humanism is different from Lefort’s. According to the latter, it is not our condition 
that allows us to transcend our subjectivity. In fact, the point of departure is radically different: 
Lefort does not begin with human subjectivity, but with social, economic, and political conditions. 
These conditions explain why the human being becomes an enigma (while, for instance, Sartre 
attributes the same fact to the death of God). What links human beings to one another is not 
primarily their freedom of choice or their responsibility, but their history. This historical 
determination does not prevent one from transcending it, although History has continuity since It 
always raises the same universal questions. Therefore, “(…) we can, in different situations, through 
different historical and cultural conditions, find problems that are timeless; and the idea that there 
is, in addition, a correct interrogation of what has to be thought is what mobilizes all of us, i.e. the 
idea that there is something today that needs to be thought and transcends our differences.” 
(Lefort, C., “L’automne du totalitarisme”, in Le Temps Présent, p. 650, my translation.) According to 
Lefort then, it is not because of Modernity or Modern Democracy that human beings are enigmas. 
They have always been enigmas, however, Modern Democracy is the first social situation to 
acknowledge and to embrace this fact. In Lefort’s view, freedom is not conceived primarily as a 
freedom of choice, but as a political freedom i.e. the birth and the extension of a symbolic public 
space. (See Lefort, C., “La liberté à l’ère du relativisme”, in Le Temps Présent, pp. 631-655). 
Finally, even though this discussion is not directly linked to the present topic, it is difficult to 
present the main differences between Sartre and Lefort without mentioning the intellectual dispute 
the two scholars have about the French Communist Party, and that took place in Les Temps 
Modernes. Sartre published two articles where he proclaimed his engagement with the Communist 
Party, while Lefort expressed his disagreement with the political party in 1953, in his article 
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Human nature and law become enigmas since what they are is no longer considered 
predictable: once debates are opened and defined as places where decisions are taken, no 
one can predict with certainty what results they will lead to. Nevertheless, do we not have 
here a kind of universality? Even though we do not know, and cannot determine, what 
human nature is, we seem to presuppose that such a thing exists and therefore, we are still 
trying to bring determinations to the table. By accepting and trying to work for a 
democratic social life, we in fact assume the indetermination of human nature. 
Nonetheless, we do not abandon such an idea since it somehow represents the condition 
of the possibility of Democracy itself30. Therefore, have we not reached – precisely because 
of the awareness of Otherness – a universal concept of Human nature? Can we not say that 
modern men are universally enigmas? 
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“Marxism and Sartre”, questioning its “Marxism” (Lefort, C., “Le Marxisme et Sartre”, in Eléments 
d’une critique de la bureaucratie, Paris, Genève: Droz, (1953) 1971, pp.59-79). Sartre replies to this 
strong criticism in a long and vehement article, “Answer to Claude Lefort” (“Réponse à Claude 
Lefort”, in Situations VII, Paris: Gallimard, (1953) 1965, pp. 7-93) stating that since Lefort is nothing 
more than an intellectual bourgeois, he has no legitimacy discussing the essence or the actions of 
the proletariat. Lefort’s answer was published a year after, even though it was written in 1953. In 
his “From the answer to the question”, he reproaches Sartre for being silent about the link between 
the French Communist Party and Stalinism. (C. Lefort, “De la réponse à la question”, in Éléments 
d’une critique de la bureaucratie, pp. 80-108.) We mention these articles here in order to underline 
the gap between the two scholars. 
30 Lefort, C., “La dissolution des repères et l’enjeu démocratique”, p.567: “What seems to me to be 
the greatness of Democracy, is the fact that it acknowledges that everyone is elusive for others.” 
(my translation). 
